The Impact of Changes in Common Property Resource Management on Intrahousehold Allocation

This paper examines the implications for developing countries of changes in access to common property resources (CPR), particularly forest resources, caused both by increasing privatization and commercialization of such resources, and by population pressures that diminish per capita access to them. These changes not only affect the manner in which the basic household unit organizes itself and distributes income to individuals within it, but have broader implications for the well-being of the rural poor, especially women, who depend heavily on access to CPR for income.

The authors use mathematical analysis to examine two standard models of intrahousehold allocation of resources. One, the unitary model, as developed by Pitt, Rosenszweig, and Hassan, assumes that all household resources, including individual incomes, are pooled to maximize family welfare. Pooling can lead to inequality in distribution, although this effect may be offset by a household preference for equality. The second, the collective model, based on noncooperative game theory, calls into question the assumptions of the unitary model, especially the pooling of income. The authors use these models to address two questions: (1) what are the effects of changes in man- agement of CPR on intrahouse- hold resource allocation and (2) are these effects different in unitary and collection household resource allocation models.

The Study
The study examines a range of literature dealing with the changing access to common property resources in rural areas of India and other subsistence rural economies. It finds that with the exception of fisheries, where men predominate, the gathering of materials from common property resources, particularly forests, is the task of women and children. The literature cited notes that access to forest resources—including firewood, oil seeds, grasses, and minor foodstuffs such as fruits and mushrooms—is declining rapidly, and that since these resources are gathered largely for sale rather than consumption, this decline is having a negative effect on household income. Both models assume that income is affected by two main factors: (1) a fall in the price of forest goods due to declining demand for traditional products, and (2) the im-position of a fixed cost fee (a fee charged by owners or the state, or a bribe paid to an official for access) for use of the forest. A third, lesser factor considered is the decline in the productivity of gathering forest goods.

In both the unitary and the collective model, the household is presumed to consist of two agents, a man and a woman. The man gives his labor time to producing a crop; the woman to gathering goods from a communal forest. The question addressed in each model is how total household earnings, which are used primarily to purchase food, are divided between the agents and how the amount of food consumed by each and the amount of labor time each contributes determines individual health.

"The study examines a range of literature dealing with the changing access to common property resources in rural areas of India and other subsistence rural economies."

Findings
In the unitary model, the calculations show that a decline in the price of forest goods is detrimental in terms of household resource allocation—and consequently in income and health for the household member devoting him or herself to the gathering of forest goods. A decline in forest productivity has the same result. Interestingly, imposition of a fixed cost fee for use of the forests has no effect on intrahousehold allocation of resources in the unitary model.

The collective model, where the agents allocate resources and set levels of labor time through a cooperative bargaining process, is marked by an absence of altruism. The baseline for bargaining for each agent is a fallback position representing essentially a breakup of the household unit, with each agent acting independently. The model does allow for transfer of resources between the agents to ensure equality. However, such a transfer results in a reduction in resources for both. As in the unitary model, a fall in forest product prices adversely affects both the household and the forest product gatherer. In addition, a rise in fixed costs in the cooperative model has a greater negative effect since it reduces the gatherer's fallback position.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
In developing countries, common property resources are important income sources for certain groups within communities and certain individuals in households. Changes in CPR management that. impose costs on these groups or individuals, or cause a decline in prices or productivity associated with the CPR, may worsen intrahousehold alloca-tion of resources to individuals who rely on such resources. The authors suggest that policymakers concerned with welfare consider the precise identity of CPR users before advocating any change in CPR ownership or use.

Because this study is based on modeling rather than empirical data, the authors also recommend empirical investigation of CPR management and in- trahousehold resource allocation in order to develop approaches that are appropriate for each situation.

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