What are the political measures that might be taken to advance the interests of poor livestock producers in developing countries given the political economy context within which the policies that affect them are being shaped? To answer this question a team of researchers from the University of California, Berkeley carried out a series of eleven case studies for FAO – in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Senegal, Uganda, Vietnam and (as an example of the effects of the 'global north' on LDC policy realities) the European Union, and the SPS work of the World Trade Organization, CODEX and the OIE.
The presentation will demonstrate that patron-clientage still looms large in the political economy of the poor in LDCs, but that now the linkages are becoming internationalized, often in new and complex ways. Long term investments by NGOs and donors (international and local; religious and secular; political and apolitical) in the capacity of poor livestock producers and other peasants for political organization ultimately will have great benefits for the poor. Given the general weakness of peasants in their political systems, progressive policy reform at the national level also depends on the identification of elite allies whose interests are coordinate with those of poor livestock producers at the moment. There is a similar need for identification of intra-elite conflicts that might lead one party to take initiatives that would have pro-poor side effects. The possibilities of building pro-poor alliances are likely to vary by level, function and geographical area of government, although in different ways in each country. Thus, for example, decentralization has quite different implications for poor producers, depending on the political system.
Please RSVP to 202-862-8107 or Email: s.hill-lee@cgiar.org.